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Resumo: Entender as expressões 
idiomáticas utilizadas na representação 
da individualidade literária como 
encenações e afirmações retóricas é 
observar sua construção contextual 
dentro de variáveis campos de poder e 
significado inseparáveis das situações 
específicas e discerníveis, convenções 
culturalmente específicas que afetam sua 
narração, em suma, a especificidade do 
momento histórico. No contexto japonês, 
a identidade não é claramente a essência 
unificada implicada pela premissa 
cartesiana, mas pode ser a apresentação 
ou a realização de uma localização 
espaciotemporal de contradição e 
desunião, um nexo em que múltiplos 
discursos coincidem temporariamente 
de maneiras notáveis e discerníveis que 
apreendemos no self abstraído. Mas não 
basta que nós, como leitores, celebremos 
na particularidade dessas performances 
como expressões do que é muitas vezes 
ignorado como “conhecimento local”. 
Em vez disso, devemos questionar o 
que instituições sociais — sejam elas 
alienígenas ou indígenas — essas 
performances abordam. A que convenções 
elas se opuseram? Que aparato de poder 
a dialética do olhar coloca em oposição? 
Pois apenas questionando as estratégias 
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The language of self, power, meaning...
Initial remarks
That the omniscient narrator of Yamada Emi’s recent novel 
Animaru rojikku (Animal Logic, 1996) speaks confidently in the first 
person but is hardly what we might call human seems, circumstantially, 
to support what Nobel laureate Oe Kenzaburô has prophesied, 
Cassandra-like, for well over two decades, the irrelevancy of serious 
fiction in contemporary Japan and the imminent death of jun bungaku, 
pure literature 1. This unusual voice, a nexus representing a particular 
moment in the production of narrative forms where ideology, history 
and culture converge, however, suggests to me just the opposite. The 
1 See, for example, Kenzaburô (1986, p.6). A similar concern punctuates his 1986 
address at Duke University, reprinted as Kenzaburô (1989); as well as his 1992 series 
of NHK broadcasts, reprinted in Kenzaburô (1994).
que ergueram a fachada de limites em geral e uma em particular que criou as ilusões 
de isolamento do self do jogo de relações de poder em obras específicas de auto-
representação ficcional, podemos esperar forçar uma maior reconsideração de si 
mesmos e seus caminhos para o aparecimento. Em muitos aspectos, minha tarefa 
como membro de uma determinada audiência de leitura foi e sempre será visualizar o 
impacto global das forças culturais sobre os padrões de auto-representação ficcional 
e aceitar que a identidade é negociada, aberta, cambiante, ambígua, resultado de 
significados culturalmente disponíveis e encenações ilimitadas e poderosas destes 
significados em situações diárias.
Palavras-chave: Pronomes de primeira pessoa. Japonês. Ideologia.
Abstract: To understand the idioms used in representing literary selfhood as 
enactments and rhetorical assertions is to observe their contextual construction within 
shifting fields of power and meaning inseparable from the specific and discernible 
situations, culturally specific conventions affecting their narration, in short, the 
specificity of historical moment. In the Japanese context, identity is clearly not the 
unified essence implied by the Cartesian premise, but it can be the presentation or 
performance of a spatiotemporal locatedness of contradiction and disunity, a nexus 
wherein multiple discourses temporarily coincide in remarkable and discernible ways 
we apprehend in the abstracted self. But it is not enough that we as readers celebrate 
in the particularity of these performance as expressions of what is often dismissed as 
“local knowledge.” Rather, we must question what social institutions--be they alien 
or indigenous--these performances address. What conventions did they oppose? What 
apparatus of power does the dialectic of the gaze set itself in opposition? For only by 
questioning the strategies that erected the facade of boundedness in general and one 
in particular that created the illusions of insulating the self from the play of power 
relations in specific works of fictional self-representation can we hope to force a larger 
reconsideration of selves and their pathways to emergence. In many ways, my task 
as a member of a particular reading audience has been and will always be to visualize 
the overall impact of cultural forces on patterns of fictional self-representation and to 
accept that identity is negotiated, open, shifting, ambiguous, the result of culturally 
available meanings and the open-ended, power-laden enactments of these meanings 
in everyday situations.






presence of a self-referential AIDS virus on the contemporary Japanese 
literary scene, on the one hand, demonstrates de facto both that the 
worlds we inhabit are symbolically constructed and that our cultural 
symbols are endowed with and have the potential for power. On the 
other, by recalling previous family histories of infection, by recognizing 
people who share the same fate as its carrier, a black prostitute 
named Jasmine who walks and works the streets of New York, and 
by confronting from its limited vantage such difficult social issues 
as racism, miscegenation, and sexual promiscuity, for example, it 
underscores a point that Gallimard had tried to get across to his own 
captive audience, namely that “we are all prisoners of our time and 
place.”2  How it perceives reality is, this particular equal-opportunity 
virus confidently chides us time and again, how it lives it. Likewise, 
the variety of activities, interests, networks and movements that 
shape its reality determines how it represents itself to us. However 
much we might deny it, those conventions by which it recognizes its 
universe of flop houses, casual romps, and racial segregations enable 
us as readers to assume our current place within our own familiar 
settings.  Erecting both a world uniquely suited to those of us who will 
populate it and actively fashioning us so that we can, in fact, live there, 
those conventions we recognize under the rubric of culture are, we are 
shown rather than told, doubly constructive. More important, all such 
constructions are necessarily ideological.
What ought to be immediately obvious from my discussion, the 
term “culture” as it is most often found in anthropology corresponds 
closely with my own usage of “ideology.” Both alert us to a “whole 
way of life” in the processual and the potential and simultaneously 
implicate a kinetic “state of interaction” where any number of factors, 
the legal and commercial, the technological and artistic, and the moral, 
contribute to a larger, complex system of values. On closer scrutiny, 
however, there is at least one significant difference. By justifying and 
criticizing the fundamental conditions under which a group of people 
live, cultural conventions are themselves contributed to and arise from 
another sphere of influence, ideology. In a very real sense, then, culture 
simultaneously conditions a group sharing the same environment, 
the same education and life experiences, for example, and, as such, 
is not individually determined, but insofar as it represents at any 
particular point in time a marvelous synergy of individual responses--
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discernible movements between personal empowerment and avoidance 
or willful confrontation, between expressions of overt individualism 
and collectivism, between discipline and spontaneity, deference and 
intimacy, and between the masculine and the feminine — it is of necessity 
ideologically bound. What Gordon Childe sees as a discernible artifact at 
once the concrete expression and the embodiment of “human thoughts 
and ideas,” is, Yuri Lotman reminds us, “a text--a complexly structured 
text, divided into a hierarchy of intricately interconnected texts within 
texts.” Fashioning human environments in their interactions, power, 
gender, and the like, in short, not only fuel the interdriven dynamo 
behind the semiotics of a culture. They become it.3
Thus, as we speak of the text so, too, are we necessarily speaking 
of its inherent or internal ideological framework, but in a world where 
“human thoughts and ideas” exist within a discernible context and are 
always as much historical as they are rhetorical, ideology is left exposed 
for what it is: an historical process framed by the very machinations of 
rhetoric. By boldly applying such a situational approach in this instance, 
arising from Martin Heidegger’s work) to literary theory, for example, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer reintroduces the notion of culture as text into our 
discussions of representations; as he does so, he simultaneously divests 
and disabuses ideology of its universalist pretensions. Put differently, 
what we abstract as the marvelous, neatly parceled bundle of meaning 
inherent to a work in general does not suddenly materialize sui generis 
into the world as a finished product but arises, instead, out of the 
multifaceted, complex relationships between culture and ideology. His 
argument, furthermore, implies that literature in particular finds its 
continued existence within any given number of ideological fields, not 
the least of which is the introduction of difference into personal reading 
by an individual reader. Existing in time and space and ranging across 
cultural contexts, it nonetheless does not transcend these dimensions 
but rather must be perceived through them. 
 Accepting that literature is inseparable from the totality of 
culture and cannot be studied divorced from its cultural contexts, 
ideology included,4 we are left to question those very characteristics Oe 
3 For a fuller discussion of the implications of culture, see Williams (1953) and Marcus; 
Fischer (1986, p. 25-33).  My discussion benefits from other approaches to the subject 
as well, among them Hofstede (1980); Lotman (1994); Childe (1956); Geertz (1980); 
Marcus; Fischer (1986); Clifford; Marcus (1986); Douglas (1973); and Binford (1972).
4 I am not suggesting that a text can only be read within the cultural contexts within 






valorizes as “serious” and “relevant” in modern Japanese literature. 
Put unceremoniously, the hunted, haunted individuals whose arduous 
labors had freed Japan from two and a half centuries of oppressive 
isolation and whose thoughts, feelings, and actions now merit our closer 
scrutiny deviate in no significant ways from a character type originating 
with the Sturm und Drang, with Goethe’s Young Werther and Höderlin’s 
Hyperion, for example.5 Certainly, Japan during the first decade of 
this century witnessed the emergence and, to differing degrees, the 
dispersion of a monological idiom of self, based upon the demands 
and complexities of one’s own private being. And just as certain, the 
resulting watakushi shôsetsu loosely “I novel”), the expression de jeur 
of the Naturalist movement as it evolved within a Japanese context, in 
conjunction with a wide variety of experimentations with first-person 
representations, provided not only a means to place this newfound self 
at the center of literary pursuits but also established a viable vehicle by 
which disenfranchised or marginalized writers might “confirm their 
isolation” as they “pondered larger questions of human life.”(LIPPIT, 
1980, p.4)6 . The most unforgettable characters from the period — the 
likes of Mori Ogai’s schizophrenic, increasingly misanthropic narrators, 
Natsume Sôseki’s hapless vagabond miner-turned-accountant, Mishima 
Yukio’s auto-intoxicated Ko-chan and beyond--exhibit, in accordance 
with current scholarly prejudices, a monolithic sameness. They are, we 
are told, heroic figures whose role vis à vis society typically assumed 
precisely the moral isolation and spiritual autonomy common to Oe’s 
high-brow disaffected rebels. We are virtually never told that such 
readings of these representations depend upon the most distinct and 
commanding features of an alien realist practice for their very existence 
from the beginning, take into account the culture within which it is being read. 
Certainly, then, my readings of works by the American writers Toni Morrison and 
Amy Tan, for example, are just as valid and just as insightful as those of my reading 
peers from Ethiopia or Brazil, Norway or Japan, provided that each of us as readers 
accounts for the current cultural contexts that affect, indeed define, the process.
5 In fact, Hôlderlin’s description of Hyperion in many ways became the standard 
archetype for the romantic hero, the figure of which has until recently dominated our 
representations:
Der Wildersinn in ihren Sitten vergnügte mich, wie eine Kinderposse, 
und weil ich von Natur hinaus was über all ‘die eingeführten Formen 
und Bräuche, spielt’ ich mit allen, und legte sie an und zog sie aus, 
wie Fastnachtskleider.
(HÖLDERLIN, 1957, p.22)
6 Insofar as the term watakushi shôsetsu has come to represent the controlling 
philosophy of the intellectual life of the late Meiji, its usage implies a complacent 
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and that they grant cultural authority to a distant entity from without 
at precisely that moment when Japan herself was grappling internally 
with the notions of identity, self, and modernity.
But it is less the characters and their representations than their 
intricate boundedness with culture and ideology as physical, corporeal, 
and linguistic sites of multiple and inextricable histories, however, 
that concern me here. When appropriated and rendered indigenous, 
twisted to form vibrant new figures for Japanese-styled Angst against 
a background of rapid and uncertain social change, these narratives 
expose in one way or another the gap between themselves and the 
cultural milieus into which they were born. Possessed of an alien voice 
with which they have yet learned to cope, they shape their lives as 
texts in effect to become the bodies of their learning, the instruments 
by which they may eventually become the owner of their voices. 
Concomitantly fixed and trying to find some ever-elusive place within 
a larger cultural process they still cannot understand, they have little 
choice but to negotiate unendingly their positions in order to lend 
some validity to their very “being.” Unambiguously chauvinistic, their 
quest for just such a modern self in the singular, I believe, arrogantly 
presumes both the existence of a cohesive, self-contained “whole,” to be 
conceived of, grasped, condensed and, through dissection, understood 
and controlled--or, in the case of writing, articulated within existing 
frames of knowledge. 
It is perhaps helpful to recall at this point in my discussion 
that this modern, thoroughly Western notion of the individual as 
a conventional trope is most frequently traced to René Descartes’ 
concept of thinking substance or self-consciousness, constituting as 
it were one-half of the metaphysical world. From there, the notion 
of conscious individual substance reaches its fullest development in 
the writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz with the idea of the monad, 
where, metaphysically speaking, individuality is all there is. Sometime 
later, Johann Gottfried von Herder historicizes the Leibnizian concept 
of individuality by suggesting that the evolution of the individual 
monad from culture to personality becomes essential for understanding 
its identity and not just its formal self-conscious or apperceptive 
self. Certainly trumpeting the success of Meiji-period bunmei kaika 
ideology as Japan arrived among the “world of civilized nations,” this 
particular act of subjection, I willingly concede, did in fact authorize the 






reflection. But as I do so, I acknowledge both that his representation as 
such is a product of language and that as a representation he reflects 
the various aspects of an emerging nationalism. If we recall that the 
State-authorized dictates of genbun’itchi undô ostensibly eradicated any 
vestigial differences reflecting the earlier Tokugawa mind set in favor of 
a single voice and that this new voice was intended to serve the demands 
of national construction, we cannot deny that his newfound equality 
betrays, as Saeki Shôichi suggests, a larger truth at work whereby the 
“I” assigned to these first-person narrators is “partially” a narrative 
convention, a medium that enables writers to construct their works 
within the particularities of their cultural frames. His observations echo 
those by Tosaka Jun, who as early as 1936 i.e., amidst the Pacific War) 
argued that, whereas the individual is a cultural construct, prevailing 
notions of self are reducible to matters of “literary representation.” Put 
differently, however transparent and unmediated, however quotidian 
and parochial these narratives of everyday life may appear on the surface, 
their narrators--Saeki describes them as “recognizable individuals” — 
are rendered intelligible to us as outside readers only via a profound, 
culturally-sanctioned illusion, namely an image of wholeness premised 
upon a unified, autonomous self, created within discernable parameters 
of convention.7
Resorting to a contemporary disposable idiom that challenges 
this premise and exposes the illusion that is the essence of her “being,” 
Sakurai Mikage, the recently orphaned narrator in the first section of 
Yoshimoto Banana’s Kitchin Kitchen, 1988), muses to herself: “Have 
I lost my senses, I wondered. It was like being falling-down drunk.” 
“My body,” she candidly remarks, “shared no connection with me.”8 
Her newfound understanding tacitly confirms that self-awareness 
makes virtue of necessity, so to speak, as it accounts for the particular 
historical circumstances and the generative principles that lend unity to 
its particular cultural contexts. Moreover, insofar as her self-realizations 
7 Compare Saeki Shôichi (1981, p.76) with Tosaka Jun (1966, p.265). Although they 
were unable to articulate it as such, both seem to suggest that neither the abstract 
theoretical self signaled by the Cartesian cogito nor the Kantian transcendental ego 
stands up well in articulations of personal character in Japan.  Recent scholarship is 
only beginning to adddress these shortcomings. See, for example, Odin (1997); and 
Ames et al. (1993).
8 “Jibun no kinô ga kowaretaka to omotta. Monosugoku yopparatte iru toki mitai ni, jibun 
ni kankei nai tokoro de. . . .” (BANANA, 1988, p. 56). Richard Rorty gives an excellent 
overview of the problems inherent to Descartes’ understanding and the ensuing 
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rescue modern Japanese literature from the passive category of display 
discourse by privileging an activist perspective and  emphasizing its 
impact as well as its subversive potential, they require the construction 
of a poetics of narrative that defamiliarizes, as it  accounts for, the 
importance of narrative voice, not by subordinating or reducing particular 
characters to the unilateral intentions of their authors — already a 
commonplace in Japanese literary criticism — but by positioning texts, 
narrators, and authors into the larger, far more dynamic poesis of the 
culture itself. But perhaps most important, by breaching a point almost 
completely neglected in discussions of first-person narratives and the 
emerging concepts of self and selfhood in post-Restoration Japan, her 
words demonstrate that the very terminology necessary to describing 
such representations is not universally applicable. 
The historical moment
Heralded by the restoration of the Emperor Meiji in 1868, Japan 
embarked upon a tempestuous and dizzying, increasingly vociferous 
course of profound political and social, economic and intellectual 
transformations in an attempt to align herself with the modern 
industrialized West, and her efforts resulted in an eventual shift away 
from a vertical society with its increasingly overt threats of civil disorder 
toward the horizontal, no longer inscribed in terms of hierarchy but by 
the notions of center and periphery.  Although it is beyond the scope 
of my discussion to trace either the historical development of a Meiji 
system of values or to present a cohesive or comprehensive statement 
on late Meiji culture, it is worthwhile that to recognize that modes 
of representation, too, underwent equally profound changes. The 
particular self-reflexive, self-conscious performative spaces we now 
recognize collectively as modern selfhood gendai jiga) are the result of 
a shift in paradigm, the product of historical and contemporary forces 
taking hold and fighting for dominance upon the Japanese stage. Just as 
borders across the nation fell and margins crept forward to become the 
center, on the personal level, a single person might merge with the Other 
to cross borders and boundaries and, in doing so, might dare to move 
from the peripheral to the center, as erstwhile samurai and outcasts 
alike would try to do. It was equally possible to fall back, out of the 
limelight and into oblivion. But whatever the case, it was now possible 






living apart,” as Thomas Carlyle had observed of this particular form of 
heroism in its Western manifestations — and, as important, to define 
him without reference to a certain group. On a theoretical level, as an 
individual he was free to “find place and subsistence by what the world 
would please to give him. . . .”(CARLYLE, 1840, p. 182)9. But a word 
of caution is in order here: in practice, this unprecedented degree of 
freedom often meant the conscious rejection of living older cultural roles 
and thus manifest itself in a widespread desire to live, to some extent 
even to invent, new ones. The varied trajectories with which Japanese 
writers enthusiastically and assiduously experimented to express the 
dynamics of such a concept resulted in an active search for appropriate 
modes of expressions, at times bewildering and widely ranging, but 
always multiplicitious and diverse, and potential. Unwilling to “number 
the streaks of the tulip,” as Johnson might have put it, they did not 
succumb to a rigid criterion of self imposed from outside but instead 
used this criterion to embrace extravagantly imaginative conceptions 
of Japanese selfhood “from the inside.” Even as they did so, they were 
actively fashioning their own cultural history by problematizing the 
nature and practices of representation in a modern Japanese context. 
Riddled with a contradiction that belabors this point, the 
terminology used to describe these representations, in fact, coexists 
alongside of a very different set of assumptions according to which the 
self is culturally conditioned and, as such, enjoys neither individuality 
nor personal freedom except as consoling illusions. Whether it be Mori 
Ogai’s kojinshugi individualism) in his 1911 dramatic scenario Robinson 
Kurusô, or Natsume Sôseki’s more frequently recognized usage of the 
same term, usually traced to a particular lecture given in 1914, as a 
concept and in the final years of the Meiji a highly negative-laden 
one) individuality reflects in one sense no more than the culmination 
of an on-going dialogue that characterized the early decades of the 
post-Restoration period. But a point that we should not overlook, the 
expression of such a concept can be found far earlier. In the third book 
of Ihara Saikaku’s Kôshoku gonin onna (Five Women Who Loved Love, 
1686), for example, when Moemon and Osan flee the household, they 
are, in effect, exerting their own will, their individuality, as a dangerous 
expression of their desire to act completely and utterly without regard 
for others. Clearly, their actions prove their downfall and, ultimately, 
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are responsible for their deaths.10 Ogai remarks on a similar danger as 
he translated Henrik Ibsen’s verse-drama Brand in 1903. Notice how he 
interprets the plot of this work for his readers:11
. . . . [Brand] seeks the ideal.  He does not think twice of 
sacrificing his wife and children for the sake of what he is 
seeking.  He even destroys himself.  Some people have even 
made the mistake of interpreting Brand as a satire.  But in 
point of fact, Ibsen is absolutely serious; serious in pointing 
out the way upward.  All or nothing--this is Brand’s ideal 
(MORI, 1903, s.p)
And it is squarely within this very same tradition that Omi falls 
in Mishima Yukio’s Kamen no kokuhaku Confessions of a Mask, 1949). 
For once he expresses himself as an individual, by creating a world 
with its own rules, he is literally expelled from school and excised 
from the novel, never to be seen from or read about again. In Japanese 
literature, as in Japanese culture, the belief that overt expressions of 
individuality eventually lead to unhappiness for all concerned has a 
long and distinguished history. 
Nor do other related expressions fare much better. First coined 
to express the notion of independence by Fukuzawa Yukichi during 
the early-Meiji in a series of privately-circulated pamphlets and later 
gathered as Gakumon no susume An Encouragement of Learning), the 
term dôkuritsu, for example, originates with John Stuart Mill’s ideal of 
individuality. The related term dôitsusei identity), however, begins to 
deconstruct itself almost from the beginning, bifurcating as it does into 
the qualifying terms dôitsuka, the identification with something, and 
dôtei, the identification of something as such.12 In fact, any adherence 
to this particular terminology when trying to articulate conceptions of 
10 On one level as an example of ukiyo-zoshi, a literary genre describing the illusory 
world of entertainment often completely different from the reality of day-to-day 
living, Kôshoku gonin onna is a novel of amorous men and women whose rollicking 
adventures provide amusing pictures of seventeenth-century life in the “floating 
world.” On another, it quite clearly underscores the wages of trespassing.  Cf. Ihara 
Saikaku (1991).
11 Compare, for example, the concept of individuality in Mori Ogai, Robinson Kurusô (in 
Ogai zenshû, 1971-75, vol. 8, p.331-42) with Natsume Sôseki, (1974). In fact, within the 
context of his novel Seinen (Youth, 1903), Ogai discusses the potential social dangers 
inherent to Western conceptions of individuality (See Ogai, Seinen, in Ogai zenshû, vol. 
6, p.315-6).
12 Yukichi (1980). Nor should such bifurcations come as a surprise to us, especially 
since in his own life he experienced their profound effects.  We need only recall that 
the once liberal Fukuzawa had by 1876 become clearly “protectionist” in outlook, a 







self and self-realization within the disparate cultural experiences of 
Japan obscures and thereby erases any native dialogue: the vernacular 
terms comprising the descriptions of the dyadic relationship of identity 
— amaeru to indulge oneself at another’s expense, a process whereby 
self/Other distinctions are blurred), wagamama indulging the self), 
amayakasu to indulge another), and magokoro a sensitivity to social 
context and to the demands of social roles), for example--are stripped 
of their so-called mimetic impulse.13 Unfortunately, the introduction 
of certain Western nuances left the door ajar for the simplistic, even 
puerile, understanding of identity as the representable awareness of 
self as self that eventually found its way into and came to characterize 
the emerging Naturalist trend in Japanese literature. 
That is not to say that the Japanese do not and did not possess a 
notion of self prior to the Restoration. They most certainly do and did. 
Nor is it to argue that the various culturally-bounded accoutrements 
of selfhood--identity and individuality, for example--have no place 
in descriptions of personal character in Japan, for again they do and 
did.14 Rather, we must move beyond simply translating the ideas and 
transposing the perspectives of one particular cultural and historical 
setting onto a Japanese context. To illustrate this point, consider the 
final scene of Ogai’s best-known drama Ikutagawa The Ikuta River, 
1910). As the young heroine contemplates suicide, a priest appears 
outside of her window. There, he intones four passages from the 
Yuishikiron, the Buddhist doctrine that all phenomena, Self included, 
are in essence Mind. Suggesting that all human suffering lies in man’s 
wayward desires, that the five senses are illusory, that the concrete 
world is not true reality, and that dualities argue for a false doctrine, 
the sutra sets forth the same doctrine uncompromisingly: that the 
distinction between Self and Other can only result in inevitable conflict 
and that the only true concept is a oneness of things, for if all perceived 
reality is merely Mind, then oppositions are in fact meaningless. That is 
to say that because all representations of selfhood as commodifications 
13 Cf. Hisa (1981, p. 249-72); Hajime (1967); Rosaldo (1984); Akira (1986); Rosenberger 
(1992).
14 Cf. Ogai, Ikutagawa (in Ogai zenshû, vol. 6, p. 485-500). Defending the presence of 
a discernible notion of selfhood in women’s writings from the Heian period, Richard 
Bowring’s argument holds true for the modern period, as well, I believe. “It is often 
assumed” he argues, “that because Buddhism brands the self as a pernicious illusion 
a sense of self could never really develop, but the opposite might well be argued: 
namely that such emphasis had to be placed on this denial precisely because the 






The language of self, power, meaning...
are themselves at one remove cultural artifacts, concrete expressions of 
culturally-framed ideas, they are necessarily remarkable and peculiar 
reflections of that culture and that culture alone; they embody the very 
ideological matrices that comprise a discernible cultural fabric and 
that delimit one culture from another. They are, the priest purports, 
no more. Read in this light, the concepts of self and individual identity 
emerging during the late-Meiji--those particular concepts that 
continue to dominate the Japanese cultural landscape even today — are 
by definition radically different from the Cartesian ones with which 
we are more comfortable and far more familiar.  It is my task to dispel 
some of their enigma to see just how.
Cultural contexts for self-representation
Both for the sake of understanding these differences and for 
scrutinizing the ways in which ideology and culture act as a mediating 
factor in lived social and individual experience, it is necessary to sharpen 
the distinctions in terms of the spatial to demarcate the boundaries within 
which the very notions of self and self-realization function. In keeping 
with the metaphorical singular entity that has dominated the contexts 
comprising Western tradition at least since Aristotle, the Cartesian Je, 
at the risk of oversimplification, represents the central point in a highly 
regular geometric space. But the historical moment within which this 
notion was introduced to Japan remains different precisely because 
the cultural background is different. The philosophical concerns for 
the self and the possibility of self-knowledge preoccupying the mind 
set of writers in mid-Meiji Japan and underpinning such diverse and 
contradictory social movements as genbun’itchi undô and jiyû minken 
undô People’s Rights Movement) are, therefore, reducible neither to 
expressions of egoistic individualism nor to remote abstracts. 
In his Ways of Seeing, the art historian John Berger observes — in 
no small measure via Sigmund Freud’s discussions of scopophilia — 
that visual representations often depict a woman’s self as being split 
into two, caught in an unceasing act of self-reflection. Sometime earlier, 
Kobayashi Hideo had arrived at a similar understanding of the self in 
general, albeit without regard for gender, in his Watakushi shôsetsuron 
An Essay on the “I-novel”), as had William James, who argued that “a 






him and carry an image of him in their mind.”15  Similarly, Freud’s 
division of the self between consciousness and unconsciousness only 
gives the appearance of undermining this metaphysical certainty. In 
Civilization and Its Discontent, for example, he argues a point anticipated 
by such eighteenth-century writers as David Hume and Denis Diderot, 
namely that the contemporary subject no longer exists as a stable fact, 
a coherent self, so to speak, because the person at the center of identity, 
as organic form, has been stripped of all such metaphysical trappings.16 
Although each of these critics appears on the surface to challenge the 
Cartesian premise, in fact, their focus on dualities in general and on 
the dialogical concept of the social self in particular prevents this from 
happening. Their methodologies are reductionist, characterized by an 
affection for and the maintenance of facile distinctions perpetuating the 
same set of tired, old binary oppositions on hand in their contemporary 
usage at least since Descartes e.g., inner vs. outer, order vs. chaos, us 
vs. them, same vs. different). Betraying itself in the affable Eurocentric 
suppositions mimesis, universalism, and humanism, for example, the 
Cartesian model allows us--indeed, it encourages us--to reaffirm 
images of ourselves in it, and perhaps for this reason alone, it continues 
to dictate the direction of most theoretical discussions, either in or out 
of Japan.
It, therefore, comes as no surprise when the Japanese 
psychoanalyst Doi Takeo employs cultural constructs sufficiently 
masked in the guise of a Western psychoanalysis to perpetuate an 
overly simplistic image of Japanese selfhood far more at home in 
Cambridge than in Tokyo or Niigata. Showing a marked preference for 
the metaphorical singular, he begins with a lesson in word origins that 
summarily obliterates any sense of nuance, noting, for example, that 
the classical usage of omote is best rendered with the contemporary kao, 
face. Similarly, ura must be taken to mean kokoro, mind. The mind-
body problematic firmly anchored, he then asserts that the gradients of 
selfhood characterizing the Japanese psyche are reducible to universals, 
binary oppositions, end points along a continuum subsumed, wholly 
and neatly, in his earlier duality: at one extreme, the tatemae, the social 
face à la T. S. Eliot’s Prufrock, juxtaposed to the opposite extreme, the 
honne, true feelings. While he ventures that the relationship between 
the tatemae and honne is symbiotic, even mutually constitutive, he does 
15 Berger (1972); Hideo (1962); and James (1950, p. 294).
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so only after hanging a plethora of similar binaries e.g., ura vs. omote; 
uchi vs. soto) out to dry. Ultimately, his linguistic manipulations prove 
his undoing. For example, by invoking the usage of ura-omote, as he 
sees it the successful fusion of polarities, to underscore the beneficial 
necessity to all such symbiotic relationships, he inevitably introduces 
an element of categorical confusion as his example deconstructs itself 
in the more substantial usage “inappropriate side” or “insincerity.” 
Damning with its cultural erasure and smacking of an imperialist bent 
not toward his own culture), his apologetic framework, in its reliance 
upon illumination from without to defrock the mysteries within, 
concomitantly eradicates by his very conceptualization the original 
nuance of existing native insights and lends to an overwhelming sense 
of mystification.17  
But let me not be misunderstood: I am not suggesting the 
absence of indigenous nuances of self-awareness. The mere existence 
of a native terminology lends credence to the opposite. Rather than 
dualistic or essentialist categories, however, they are to my mind 
contextually constructed and are ever shifting. Foreseeing how cultural 
contexts result in shared intelligibility and suggesting the Modernist 
contention that an individual is somehow located within a world of signs 
and not within the world itself, Judith Butler’s work offers, I believe, a 
different model by which to approach the machinations we recognize 
as the modern self in Japan. Summing up the inherent shortcomings 
of the Cartesian paradigm, she contends that any discussion of a stable 
and interior self, of identity as a singular entity, or of a coherent subject 
must necessarily espouse
the point of view of an agent who masters its environment 
and the social relations it is in without ever being of that 
environment or of those relations.  If the structure of agency, 
reflection, or internalization, is identical to itself throughout 
its travels, then it is ontologically immune from the social 
field that it negotiates and, in keeping with the enlightenment 
versions of anthropocentrism from which this subject is derived 
makes itself the ontological center of a world from which it is 
nevertheless ontologically distinct. (BUTLER, 1989, p.23-4).
17 Takeo (1985, p.24, 26-87). Hardly surprising given his training in Western 
psychoanalysis, Doi overlooks a long tradition of “self” in Japan, albeit one that does 
not conform neatly to the Western need for definition. Doubtless, Buddhism has 
long advocated the annihilation of the very idea of an individual ego, the summation 
of modern Western understandings of self. Completely comprehensible if we insist 
on situating the particularity of Japanese culture within Doi’s paradigm, Buddhism 






Anticipating this process of “self-subjection,” whereby the 
narrating subject attempts to lay bare such distinctions in becoming 
the narrated object, Martin Heidegger had earlier argued in his essay 
“Bauen Wohnen Denken,” for example, that the verb bin in the phrase 
ich bin originates with the root bauen, “to build” or “to inhabit.” 
His understanding would profoundly color Gaston Bachelard’s 
conclusion that the self is, therefore, no more than the sum of the 
various functions of habitare. In stark contrast to James’ social self, 
Marcel Mauss’ acceptance that the personne morale is in large part a 
social creation similarly embraces the possibility that the various roles 
I insist on recognizing as the Self in myself are in effect defined by 
ritual observations and are, therefore, by their very nature culturally 
specific and ideologically determined.18 Efficiently eliminating one-half 
of Descartes’ metaphysical premise with the swipe of their pens, they 
have in one fashion or another likened the self to the spatiotemporal 
unfolding of the very proposition “I am.” Arising through communicative 
interactions between the individual and society, it embodies, in short, 
a particular conceptualization of the categorical “I,” disingenuously 
concealed behind a universal, arguably beneficent Humanism, 
intricately and inextricably linked with larger notions of self-realization. 
Appropriating Heidegger’s and Bachelard’s metaphor, Dorrine Kondo 
(1990, p.35) challenges us to think of individual representations not in 
isolation but as complex, as-yet unfinished compositions within which 
the preposition of existence is penned through social interactions with 
others. Relationships--and the dynamic of power inherent to any such 
notions must be reckoned with when discussing the Japanese context-
-define the roles of the individual and, equally so, enable our definition 
of others.  
Thus, in order to range beyond the limits of parochialism to 
challenge old theoretical boundaries that do little more than delimit or 
pigeonhole our readings of texts as they construct, maintain, and amplify 
our cultural identities, we must concomitantly embrace, encourage, 
and promote, even facilitate, readings that do more than reaffirm our 
Eurocentric identities. This requires the close reading of individual 
texts, not as an end to itself but in order to illuminate their functioning 
within broader and institutionalized systems in which cultural and social 
meanings are constructed and contested. Because those bridges linking 
art to artist, text to author, as well as the relationships between art 
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and social and historical reality--”Je suis artiste,” the gros monsieur 
announces in Eugène Ionesco’s Le Tableau, “J’ai surpassé le modèle! 
J’ai fait mieux que le peintre …”— comprise the particularity of a given 
cultural tradition and the archetypal creative imagination undergirding 
it, they, too, provide the basis for a conceptual framework within which 
we may understand the dynamics of Japanese subjection. In short, 
issues of selfhood refer to themselves as ongoing performances, vibrant 
cultural spectacles that refer to their own and to the Others’ mutually 
constitutive powers of stylized interpretation. 
Regardless of the nature of the text, any insights into the 
identity of the self I happen to tender as a result of the act of narrating 
are simultaneously apprehended through, as well as an apprehension 
of, a particular linguistic ideology itself.19 Western constructions of 
the individual, for example, place emphasis upon the self as a mental 
and physical life centered on the linguistic first-person singular. 
A distillation of a particular linguistic ideology, this autonomous 
personality is reducible to the space of “I,” although an abundance of 
like terminology — being or essence, consciousness or humanity, for 
example — demonstrate fait accompli the problem of its representation 
in writing. Joan Webber observes the dynamic of this monological 
conception within precisely the same historical frame that the Cartesian 
premise finds its origins thus: 
seeing and seeing that he sees--and is seen; writing, and 
conscious of the complex relationship between the “I” he 
thinks of as himself and the “I” which emerges on paper; 
conscious too that this relationship--and his attitude toward 
the literary “I”--will differ from the reader’s, he may produce 
an “I” that plays games with the audience, teasing them about 
his identity in a way that had very seldom been tried in earlier 
literature. (WEBBER, 1968, p.12-3).
In point of fact, the linguistic ideology characterizing the 
English language presumes in its very nature an isolated self the 
equivalent of which is the whole, bounded subject, the projection of and 
embodied in the first-person pronoun “I.” Its singularity is obvious. 
Equally obvious is its invulnerability: it meanders in and out, from one 
scenario to the next, forever remaining immutability and unscathed. 
The “I” is always and forever just that “I.” The autonomous self as it is 
often framed in professional and leisurely discourses, then, is at once 
the sedimentation of historical and cultural contexts and linguistic 






ideology; its representing “I” is no more than a convenient sign, caught 
as it is in relationship between signifier and signified, between “the 
impression it makes on our sense” and “the psychological imprint of 
the sound.” Yet, when self and contexts chance to merge, beneficently, 
benignly or pathologically, and dissolve into nothingness, the “I” is 
revealed, Vincent Crapanzano (1982) observes, in and for its “referential 
emptiness.” Perhaps because he sensed in the possibilities of openness 
and multiplicity a threat, Ferdinand de Saussure (1966, p.66) dismissed 
the importance of context in constituting meaning, as well as the 
potential for multiple meanings betrayed in multivocality, by including 
it under the rubric of parole (“spoken language,” as opposed to the 
more highly regarded organizing principle, langue). Our challenge is 
not to do the same.
First-person referentials in modern Japanese
Inscribed within this difference, the emerging self in a Japanese 
context is dispersed through the space from which it takes its shape 
and is, therefore, fragmented in its very existence. Such a conception 
of individuality is, Marvin Marcus (1993, p.72) notes, “irreducibly 
rational, the locus of crosscutting hereditary, familial, and affinitive 
lines,” although his usage of the term “locus” betrays a reticence on 
his part to abandon once and for all the Western-focused implications 
locatedness and centrality. This objection aside, the first-person 
grammatical category, when viewed as Marcus does, demonstrates 
similarly extraordinary complexities as an artificial construction arising 
out of dispersed and discontinuous fragments. In fact, the contemporary 
usage of jiritsu, loosely rendered as “independence” in English, 
connotes, Allison (1996, p. 109) argues, “not the ability or inclination 
to chart one’s own course in life and act in isolation from others but 
the aptitude to internalize certain habits of self-maintenance that are 
expected.” Thus, the first-person singular, encompassing in Elliot’s 
words (1982), “the thousand and one selves that constitute a ‘Self,’” 
is for Japan the product of the spatiotemporal functions presentation 
and situation. That is to say that the entity characterized as the “I” in 
these instances is defined by--and cannot be separated from--cultural 
context, thereby calling into question both the very distinction between 
and the representation of the two.  
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where the “I” equals and merely stands in for that which has already 
been registered in discourse, identity from a Japanese perspective is 
remarkably different. Jane M. Bachnik (1982) and Patricia Wetzel (1984) 
have empirically demonstrated, for example, that daimeishi, the category 
in traditional Japanese grammar most closely corresponding to European 
notions of pronouns, are indexical; they are characterized by a shifting 
in terms of social positioning and relational distance between Self and 
Other.20 Hardly the metaphorical singular entity we are accustomed to 
seeing in the West, Japanese usage encodes for a politically powerful 
metaphor taking its lead from and shaped by an extraordinarily wide 
range of contextual factors, including but not limited to issues of age, 
gender and sexual orientation, levels of formality, degree of kinship, 
occupation both status within the community at large and degree of 
skills mastered within one’s field), and contemporary and regional 
usages. More importantly, because it changes over time in response to 
the highly kinetic environment of even a single discourse as contexts 
shift, this “I” does not so neatly equate with the Cartesian notion of 
self. We need only recall, for example, the frequency with which the 
narrator Ko-chan in Mishima’s Kamen no kokuhaku shuttles between the 
first-person pronouns watashi and boku to appreciate the implications. 
A performance arising from and intricately bound to the act of reading, 
his confession provides the vehicle whereby he re-inscribes himself 
within his world, not merely by attempting to assimilate himself to his 
environment but also by creating for himself a fresh mode of relation 
toward his present and his past. What we apprehend as the narrator is 
in actuality a “self” that, despite changes, has been implicit from the 
beginning, awakening when read as an act of self-cognition that will 
integrate the past in the ubiquitous “I,” watashi or boku, depending upon 
the circumstances of the present moment. Because what we recognize 
as personal pronouns in Japanese offer convincing evidence of a larger 
ideological principle to define selves contextually,21 we as readers are 
20 Compare Bachnik (1982) and Wetzel (1984). To be sure, pronouns represent a less 
frequent phenomenon in Japanese discourse than, say, in English, French or German. 
In fact, first-person pronouns need never be used, but their absence, as in the case of 
much of Mori Ogai’s short story “Takasebune,” for example, by no means implies the 
larger absence of identity or of a discernible self/selves. A measure of a non-native 
speaker’s Japanese language skills remains the degree of intrusion of first-person 
pronouns into ordinary conversational usage.
21 The sorely polite term tonji, “son of a pig,” is used by fathers when introducing 
their sons, the implication being that, as the saying goes, “kaeru no ko wa kaeru” 
(literally, the child of a frog is a frog, or “like breeds like”). Admittedly rare these 






routinely confronted with a profoundly different way of thinking about 
and interpreting the relationship between selves and the social world 
they inhabit.  
Furthermore, because living, breathing individuals refer to 
themselves as constituted in and through their social relations and 
obligations, the boundaries often being fuzzy, blurred, or wholly 
indiscernible, their representations, too, are marked by self-reflexivity, 
deliberately signifying as it were a marshaling of attention, conscious 
or not, to the medium of the reflection. Of equal importance, the very 
existence of terms unobtrusively substituting for such pronouns--titles, 
honorifics, or certain verbs, for example22--and, in doing so, virtually 
assuring the absence of self-reference demonstrates in the extreme 
the importance of context in self-definition. When Mochizuki Akira, a 
character from Kawatake Mokuami’s kabuki Karigane (The Flying Crane 
Family Crest, 1881), speaks to his wife, the one-time courtesan Oteru, 
about the alleged amorous skills of a particular singer, “Wari ni wa iro ga 
dekinai sô da” (“In the field of amour, he can’t get it up, I hear”), he does 
at least two things (MOKUAMI, 1966, p.221-2).23  In place of a personal 
pronoun, he interjects his presence but not himself) into his utterance 
with “sô da,” “I hear,” thereby deflecting attention away from himself 
and onto the elements of hearsay. Verdictive in effect, his words do 
more than disarm his competition; they concomitantly castrate him. 
As speaker, Mochizuka is in the enviable position of attacking verbally 
the object of his criticism for being, euphemistically speaking, hardly a 
“social polish” and sophistication on the part of the speaker.
22 Titles include, for example, sensei, (“teacher,” used when the addressee is older or 
has a higher social status relative to the speaker), okusan, okâsan and mama (“wife,” 
“mother,” and “mama,” respectively, the first used as a term of address comparable 
to the English usage “Mrs.” without the family name, the second is used to a woman 
around whom there are children, and the third to the female proprietor of a bar or 
restaurant), and kachô (“head of a household,” used to addressee men at home). 
Honorifics include the use of go and o as prefixes underscoring the relative superior 
position of the addressee, as in goshimpai wo okakete shimashite, moshiwake arimasen 
(“I am very sorry to have caused you so much concern”), Gomewaku ja arimasen ka 
(“Isn’t it a bother?”), and O-kaimono desu ka (“Shopping?”). Furthermore, certain 
verbs such as hossuru (“to desire”) and hoshigaru (“to desire”)--the former used with 
first- and second-person subjects of reference, whereas the latter is used most often 
when speaking about the desires of a third person or in rarer cases to the addressee 
when admonishing or warning about the dangers of particular desires in question--
are person- or subject-specific in nature and, therefore, understandable in context. 
Cf. Takao (1978, p. 93). 
23 In fact, Karigane is most often performed as a Kiyomoto jôruri (a chanted performance 
from the puppet theatre), although the text itself was incorporated by Kawatake 
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“stallion” among the other quite ordinary “beasts of burden,” without 
having to place himself directly within the same field of contestation, 
a position where he might be held to the same exacting standards and 
where he, too, might be found lacking.
The late Emperor Hirohito’s remarks to President Richard Nixon 
in September 1975 provide an example somewhat closer in time and 
space to the here-and-now. Presumably intended as an expression of 
profound sadness and remorse for Japan’s involvement in the Second 
World War, his words, “Fukaku kanashimi to suru ano sensô,” (KIYOSHI, 
1986, p.102) did no more than tease its audience on a number of levels. 
Later, when asked whether his diction implied that he felt responsibility, 
he replied to the effect that he did not understand figures of speech 
kotoba no aya) because he was not a student of literary matters.24 I 
have intentionally not translated his remarks, for to do so would be 
tantamount to “putting words in his mouth.” To do so would also 
imply that I understand the intention behind them. I do not, since there 
are at the very least two problems hindering my fuller comprehension. 
First, the syntactic complexity of his utterance contributes to an 
enormous semantic rift in meaning. Is the term ano sensô the subject of 
the sentence (indeed, inverted subjects represent a common rhetorical 
strategy in Japanese) or does it stand as an isolated noun, modified 
by the clause, “fukaku kanashimi to suru” (“I feel profound sadness,” 
where the self-referential stance is conveyed allusively by the choice 
of verbs)? Second, the moment is rendered “empty” with the term ano 
sensô, where ano indicates in this instance something far removed from 
the present. Indeed, this may have been how he perceived the war, 
but it is difficult to imagine any genuine feelings of remorse arising 
from an event once it has intentionally been stripped of its immediacy. 
The force behind his words, therefore, speak far more than is at first 
evident, for they deconstruct themselves almost from the beginning, 
any sense of modesty having been summarily laid bare, betrayed in the 
highly articulate and skillful turn of phrase at just the right moment. 
To be sure, the original speech has been interpreted by those who seek 
a deeper understanding of the historical events during the war as no 
more than an inconsequential public address penned by another but 
presented by--many Rightists apologetically argue of similar occasions, 
24 Inoue Kiyoshi, Tennô--tennô-sei no rekishi (Tokyo: Meiseki, 1986),102; and John 
Whittier Treat, “Beheaded Emperors and the Absent Figure in Contemporary Japanese 






puppeted by--the Emperor, somewhat akin to the strategic withholding 
of the narrative indict, “he said,” during instances of plagiarism. The 
same defense, however, cannot be made for his later, clearly unscripted 
and therefore personal response.  Tinged with arrogant condescension, 
his injudicious words did nothing to assuage public uncertainties about 
his suspected role in and his guilt for Japan’s militaristic past. On the 
contrary, reflected in the deliberate and capricious ambiguity of his 
statement is the complicitous nature of his relationship to the events 
that haunted him, quite literally, “to the very end.”
However interesting such silences are, the remarkable variety 
of first-person pronouns prove far more revealing.25 At precisely that 
moment during the Meiji period when the Western concept of self was 
being imported, native lexical elements corresponding to the personal 
pronouns in European languages were recognized, quite simply, as 
nouns the original significations of which in most cases remained both 
perfectly clear and easily discernible from the context of their usage. 
The sheer number of self-referential terms in Japanese, Edward Fowler 
observes, reveals
a very protean notion of self, one that depends for its existence 
more on the person or situation with whom or with which one 
is associated at a given moment than on one’s own unilaterally 
initiated thoughts and actions.  We can think of a true pronoun 
as a sign of separate and autonomous presence, making an 
indelible boundary between self and other (FOWLER, 1988, p. 
5-6).
The partial list below illustrates the variation in, if not necessarily 
the number of, these first-person singular references. For convenience, 
I loosely follow conventional categorically divisions by separating 
those terms conveying an awareness of unequal position on the part 
of the speaker from those underscoring the speaker’s intentional self-
depreciation, regardless of actual social position.26 Because both usages 
share in common an awareness of and abeyance toward complex 
25 Absence is a possibility, as the deceptively simple sentence “Monku nashi” 
demonstrates. Rendered variously, monku as the noun “complain” and nashi as a 
verbal conveying the sense of “nonexistent,” the utterance includes as one possible 
meaning, “I have no complaints.”
26 I have limited my discussion to first-person singular expressions precisely because 
to do otherwise would be to invite the unwieldy. Consider, for example, that during 
the early Meiji, Fukuchi Gen’ichirô coined the idiosyncratic use of the terms gosô and 
gosôshi, both of which roughly translate as “we.” Borrowed from ancient Chinese, 
they represent Fukuchi’s attempt to mimic the Victorian “we,” at the time a new 
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positioning, it is wholly inconceivable that any utterance at the level 
of the sentence might escape unscathed the inscription of relationship 
between speaker and addressee.  Moreover, when both categories are 
taken together, they signify the web-like effect of an obvious inherent 
linguistic ideology relational in and of its very nature, as well as the 
permeability of self and self-constructions, of identity, in Japanese 
culture. Arguing for the overwhelming relational aspect inherent to all 
first-person terms, Harada (1975) posits a “distance cline” between 
self and other. While still dependent upon preexisting Cartesian modes 
of interpretation, his observations clarify for us that notions of self 
necessarily embody many of those values recognized as peculiar to a 
given culture. Conspicuous are the parameters of usage i.e., the degree 
of self-awareness conveyed) and the latitude i.e., the number of 
affiliations or clusterings) commonly available to a speaker of Japanese. 
Perhaps the most frequently encountered grouping includes 
watakushi and watashi, the latter abbreviated and only slightly less formal 
in usage than the former. Both originally connoted “selfishness” on the 
part of the speaker. It is precisely for this reason that Sei Shônagon 
records in Makura sôshi The Pillow Book) her response of shock and 
disbelief on overhearing certain visitors to the Heian court assert their 
own self-assessed importance by overtly referring to themselves in the 
first person in the presence of the Emperor and Empress. In Karigane, 
however, self-awareness seems entirely in keeping with the moment 
as Oteru reflects upon the uncertainty of her current state of affairs:27
. . . watashi ga aiso wo
tsukasarete, moshi mo rien ni
nattaraba, mata mo ya moto no
tabigeisha. . .  .
. . . if he loses his patience with me, worse if he divorces me, I 
would have to return to the life of a traveling geisha. . . . 
A related term, wasshi is considered by many linguists to be 
non-standard, as connoting the speaker’s use of dialect and indicative 
of his peripheral origins. More often than not, the degree of power 
associated with the term is overlooked. Nagura Toshie has observed 
of contemporary spoken Japanese that wasshi remains in use in such 






areas peripheral to metropolitan Tokyo as Hiroshima and Nagoya 
among older males. In rarer instances, it is elected by self-employed 
females who financial contributions to the economic well-being of 
the household demand a higher degree of respect from those on the 
receiving end. In Nakano Shigeharu’s Nashi no hana (Pear Blossoms, 
1957-8), a remembrance of the closing years of the Meiji period, the 
youthful narrator, recognizing “how language can mark power,” arrives 
at a similar conclusion as he catalogues those around him who elect the 
pronoun wasshi. A point that the politically-active Nakano could not 
have failed to note, his list as a written artifact excluding children and 
farmers but including the village doctor, the priest just returned from 
the Russo-Japanese War, and “most probably” the local chief of police 
damns by its very presence. Fixing an ideological dynamic of power 
and position not so very different from that in Japan’s feudal past, its 
existence suggests that, despite government claims to the contrary, the 
postwar sociopolitical climate remains significantly unchanged.28   
A number of truncations of these pronouns similarly convey 
degrees of power. The first-person references watte and wate, as well as 
wa, wai, and wasu, for example, clearly mark the speaker as peripheral to 
metropolitan Tokyo and, therefore, removed from the centers of power, 
be they political, economic, or social. Whereas the former grouping 
occurs in Kansai dialect and may, when elected in the company of non-
Kansai speakers, represent a challenge to prevailing notions of the 
importance of Tokyo by suggesting that areas in Western Japan have 
long been and are equally central to the life of the modern nation, the 
latter remains limited in its usage to areas in rural Northern Japan.
Compare these usages with waga, “my,” a highly formal and 
stylized possessive pronoun, as in conventional phrases wagaya my 
home), wagakuni my country), wagami my fate), or wagako my child) 
demonstrate.  It is this sense of formality we find in wagahime, “my 
lady” as Ogai lends his particular interpretation to William Shakespeare’s 
words in “Oferia no uta” Ophelia’s Song):29
28 Nagura Toshie, “The Use of Address Terms between Japanese Spouses,” Sekai 
no nihongo kyôiku 2 (March 1992): 61; Miriam Silverberg, Changing Song: The Marxist 
Manifestos of Nakano Shigeharu (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 27; and 
Nakano Shigeharu, Nashi no hana, in Nakano Shigeharu zenshû (Tokyo: Chikuma shobô, 
1980), vol. 6: 68-9.
29 Mori Ogai, “Oferia no uta,” in Ogai zenshû, vol. 9: 47-8; and William Shakespeare, 
Hamlet, in The Complete Oxford Shakespeare, vol. 3: IV, 5, 1150. One year after his return 
from Germany, Ogai published an anthology of translated poems entitled Omokage 
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kare wa shi ni keri wagahime yo
kare wa yomiji e tachi ni keri
kashira no kata no koke wo miyo
ashi no kata ni wa ishi tateru. . . .
He is dead and gone, lady,
 He is dead and gone.
At his head a grass-green turf,
 At his heels a stone.
In fact, given the Japanese contexts where insanity per se does 
not excuse social indiscretions, Ophelia must, in spite of her loss of self, 
maintain a degree of respect in the presence of Hamlet’s mother; hence, 
Ogai’s particular rendering remains culturally appropriate even as it 
deviates from the original. Half a century later, however, the tanka poet 
Miya Shûji’s (SHÛJI, 1989, p.137) would elect waga in self-reference for 
precisely the opposite reason, to underscore his loneliness as a lowly 




kôga no kishi no
hitori no hei no kage
falling to the ground
rifle still in tow
my shadow
along the bank of the Yellow River
the shadow of a lone soldier.
The highly unusual image of wagakage, where the stylized 
Ophelia’s Song. While Koboro Keiichirô has argued that Ogai is translating from the 
English, I believe that he used the Schlegel and Tieck German translation as his source, 
a text incidentally that he mentions in an article from May, 1893 concerning his own 
translation of Hans Christian Andersen’s Improvastoren as Sokkyô shijin. Ogai zenshû, vol. 
23: 212; Kobori, “Omokage no shigaku,” Hikaku bungaku kenkyû 25 (1974): 46-50. Aside 
from the facts that Ogai did not study English before leaving for Germany and that he 
only met with his tutor Ferdinand Ilgner for private English lessons during his brief 
stay in Berlin, the most compelling evidence is a single song from Lord Byron’s Manfred 
also included in the anthology. It is, indisputably, a translation from Heinrich Heine’s 






pronominal reference hints initially at pretensions of self-importance 
with “my shadow,” is made all the more disturbing as the poet 
either juxtaposes it to--or qualifies its description as--the haunting, 
moribund reality that is “the shadow of a lone soldier.”
Another related term asserting the importance of the speaker, 
the archaic wagahai has until recently been used only by individuals 
of high rank or achievement, political leaders during times of military 
insurgence, for example. The wildly sardonic tone of Natsume Sôseki’s 
novel, Wagahai wa neko de aru (I Am a Cat, 1905-6), arises initially because 
this particular self-reference is elected by its narrator, a nameless 
cat. Recently, a nationally-televised sales pitch aimed at promoting 
airbags in cars has cleverly exploited the degree of misunderstanding 
involved in its usage. The spokesman, the popular and impish baseball 
player Ichiro, humorously twists Sôseki’s words into “Wagahai wa neko 
duaru,” meaning “I am in a duel with a cat” before he either does 
battle with a Garfield-like feline or is intimately pawed by a leopard-
skinned nymphete. In either instance, secondary referents comprising 
the play on the English terms duel and dual further increase the sense of 
incongruence and thereby contribute to the humor of the moment. The 
logical consequence that a consumer-in-the-know ought to demand 
two airbags in a car is rendered in one sense of the word subliminal as 
expectation is subverted: the power held in reserve by the term wagahai 
gives way unexpectedly before more pressing economic--and from 
the visual implications, libidinal--powers that be. In fairness to the 
discussion, however, I must note that among native speakers, including 
those who teach in the field of kokubungaku, the original irony captured 
in Sôseki’s precarious balancing of wagahai with neko is now all but 
totally lost.30  
Further stressing the vulnerability of the self to exercises in 
affectation and stylization are such extremes as midoro, chin, and taikô. 
Whereas the term midoro connotes familiarity, chin, limited in its usage 
by the Emperor, more accurately upholds distance. Its exclusive nature 
bore the brunt of Occupation-period humor as many began to refer to 
General MacArthur as Heso-sama Mr. Navel) and the Emperor as Chinpo-
30 The term kokubungaku, relatively conservative in its usage, refers to Japanese 
literature as a field of specialization erected by and held in trust for Japanese nationals 
only (kokumin, as the postwar Constitution makes it perfectly clear). Time and time 
again, I am reminded that my specialty is Nihon bungaku (Japanese literature), a 
term liberally used in connection with foreign specialists. On occasion, derogatory in 
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sama Mr. Penis).31  Marked with the inequality inherent to their postwar 
relationship, the former located anatomically superior to the latter, 
the resultant word play subverted any prewar notions of exclusivity in 
favor of something that roughly half of the entire population shared in 
common. The Emperor’s postwar position is rendered cliché; “if you’ve 
seen one,” as the Occupying Forces were bound to respond and as 
Japan’s postwar citizenry was apt to realize, “you’ve seen ‘em all.” The 
term taikô, however, has two usages, as a reference to oneself as speaker 
when the addressee is perceived as socially inferior or as a highly self-
referential usage imploring “for my sake.” In his compilation of the 
official record of Commodore Perry’s voyage to Japan, Francis Hawks 
(1857) recalls that the American Squadron frequently encountered this 
usage. He fails to take into account the possibility of confusion resulting 
from the intercultural encounter, however, and extrapolates incorrectly 
the direction of its reference. As a pronoun, taikô demarcates social 
levels in terms of their presence and, as such, should have been taken 
by Perry’s group more as an indication from the Japanese perspective 
of the relative social inferiority of an alien presence in general and their 
utter insignificance in the presence of the shogunate in particular, than 
as specifically signifying any individual entity.32
Under certain circumstances, still another group of terms carries 
on the pronominal function of referencing, including, uchi, and jibun 
and its complement tagai. The former is used by men in Tokyo or by 
men and women alike primarily in and around Kyoto to signify in the 
absence of further modification “me,” “my household,” or “my group.” 
Although it conveys the nuance of belonging within a group setting, 
it does connote dependency.33 And while the latter pair has recently 
gained acceptance as a feminine stance suggesting, as Blanche Dubois 
31 The terms chinpo and chinchin are characteristically used by children, further 
emphasizing the perceived disparity of power between the two figures. Not surprising, 
a number of similar expression, all of which built upon a humorous genital-fixated 
incongruities (e.g., pray  and play, election and erection), enjoyed wide circulation in 
the immediate postwar period.
32 Foster Rhea Dulles does an excellent job of juxtaposing American accounts of the 
Perry expedition with those of the Japanese who observed the same events. See Dulles 
(1965).
33 Suggesting that contemporary Euro-American notions of masculinity--especially a 
rugged individualism--are gaining widespread usage in Japan, it is hardly surprising 
that those terms reflecting self-reference will also change. In Niigata, for example, 
the usage of jibun by younger men when addressing other males within a group can 
attract considerable and considerably negative attention for its obvious feminine 






could appreciate, the “kindness of strangers,” the narrator of Natsume 
Sôseki Kôfu (The Miner, 1908) challenges the accepted boundaries of 
the self as he elects one half of the pair to describe himself. The “I” 
in this highly anachronistic novel, jibun, Noriko Lippit (1980, p.192) 
argues, represents “the establishment of the relationship between the 
self and the world by tracing the growth of the self as an historical 
as well as a personal existence.” Her insights are correct insofar as 
they go, but she ignores the narrator’s reliance upon monologue. It 
is less the fragmented insights of the narrator’s psyche than his 
performances of a character from a novel — and Jay Rubin’s masterful 
reading makes this point perfectly clear — that ought to signal to us 
the marvelously parody of competing depictions of self at play and not 
a lived life per se (RUBIN, 1986). Doubtless, his performances reflect 
not only marginalized individualism--jibun is rent from tagai--but, as 
a cultural framing device necessary to the representation of character, 
they also implicate larger issues of ideological blindness resulting from 
his and our own complicity as members in society.
Hinting at a larger and pervasive controlling principle 
characteristic to the vertical nature of the culture as a whole, Basil Hall 
Chamberlain has also recognized an abundance of self-depreciatory 
terms used to position the speaking self within the context of dialogue, 
however momentarily, in relation to the addressee. Perhaps the most 
frequently encountered of these is boku. Once used exclusively by men 
outside of a formal setting, Nagura Toshie notes that the term has 
recently gained widespread usage among youth, regardless of gender, 
to underscore equanimity within a relationship (CHAMBERLAIN, 1924, 
p.13).34 Boku, however, original carried the meaning of “servant,” the 
sense of which remains in the contemporary term bokuhi, a household 
or at times public) servant. It is in this sense, I suspect, that the largely 
unobtrusive narrator of Mori Ogai’s novella Gan Wild Geese, 1911-13) 
elects its usage. Narrated from the perspective of someone identified only 
with the self-referential boku, the novella opens with an incontrovertible 
statement of fact: “It’s an old story.” This declaration not only locates 
the narration in a particular point in time; it also sets into play a specific 
set of nuances, vestiges of its earlier usage particular connotations 
of intimacy, fidelity, loyalty, or trustworthiness on the part of the 
34 Disregarding the breadth of its usage in public, however, Nagura Toshie abandons 
his descriptive stance of boku in favor of pedantry, lecturing us non-native speakers 
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speaker. Read in this way, these nuances dictate his rhetorical stance, 
the particular perspective from which he observes the hero Okada’s 
situation and through which he relates the drama of his life. Accepting 
the cultural particularity of this strategy, it seems likely to me, at the 
risk of overstatement, that this first-person narrator functions as a 
trustworthy character who as a matter of decorum identifies himself 
in an unobtrusive but characteristic fashion by removing himself to 
the periphery of the action as quickly as possible. From there he looks 
onto the action as it unfolds, and from there he disseminates his view 
accordingly. Put differently, as a storyteller faithful to his material —
Bowring (1979. p.149)  dismisses him as the “ostensible narrator” — 
he withdraws himself from center stage and allows the story itself to 
come to the fore (cf. MARCUS, 1993, p.308).
On the theoretical level, the female equivalent of boku is the 
reference atashi, although its specific connotations remind us how 
different its usage is in practice. Rather than nuancing intimacy and 
trustworthiness, for example, it conveys either a feigned absence or 
the willful relinquishing of power in the presence of others who are 
presumed (or propped up) to be stronger. Inscribed with a high degree 
of insincerity and artifice, it is most frequently used by women who 
wish to affect a more feminine, coquettish demeanor in the presence 
of men. Further complicating the situation, because its usage reflects 
an expected culturally behavior from a male perspective in certain 
appropriate contexts, atashi is also invariably elected by okama, drag 
queens, as the first-person pronoun of choice. And because of its 
affectations, many gay men at one time or another may resort to atashi 
in the “sophisticated repartee” we recognize as “camp,” a language of 
spectacle where the speaker participates in a hissing, gender-switching, 
self-dramatizing piece of “street theater” in the company of like-
minded men as an overt sign of personal empowerment.
The other frequently encountered self-deprecating reference 
is ware, a term elected by males and females alike. Because it carries 
the meaning of “oneself” while concomitantly connoting the speaker’s 
position as a member within a recognizable group, it is frequently 
rendered with such extremes in English as “we” and “ego.” Miya Shûji 
(1989, p.149) makes use of the implied sense of intimacy to underscore 











a bullet right at me
as it closes in
when I know
I throw myself at another’s feet, cowering
these short-sighted spectacles.
Ware emphasizes for us that the poet’s experiences, however 
personal, are hardly unique: wayward bullets are a common hazard in 
a soldier’s life. As all soldiers are prone to do in similar circumstances, 
he instinctively “cowers” at “another’s feet” and, only once the danger 
passes, attempts bravely to make light of his fears. His usage is nothing 
if not poignant, since it demonstrates what we as readers already know 
but may be less willing to admit. There is no shame in fear. Who among 
us, if so confronted, would not find ourselves prostrate on the floor, 
seeking cover in the boot laces of those around us?
Other self-deprecatory references include, for example, shôsei, 
soregashi, and yo, as well as ore, ora, and oidon. Originally meaning 
“small born” or “young,” shôsei was often used by male students prior 
to the Second World War in deference to their own relative insignificance 
within a larger patriarchally-aligned State-as-family.35 Although 
it continues to be used by some elderly men in highly formalized 
letterwriting as a substitute for watakushi, its usage in spoken Japanese 
is now all but obsolete, except among the most extreme of Rightist 
or Neo-nationalist groups. Originally meaning “a certain person,” 
intimating a high degree of politeness by signifying a speaker’s willful 
negation of any measure of self-importance, the contemporary usage 
of soregashi is, likewise, sorely limited. Oddly enough, it has recently 
undergone a transformation to become third-person referential. And 
the term yo is a highly stylized self-reference found exclusively in 
35 I consciously have retained the pronoun he in this particular instance as an 
example of selectively sexist, intentionally exclusive language because I have found 
no evidence that shôsei was ever widely used by women, at least during the period 
following the restoration of the Meiji Emperor. Its absence among female speakers is 
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the written language; there, it is further limited in its usage to native 
academic authors or to contexts where the authoritative stance or 
artifice of a literary style are deemed appropriate.36   
Not all such self-deprecatory references need be so overtly 
marked either by a degree of sophistication or pedantry or by a speaker’s 
comfort with an adherence to a centralizing authority, however. A once 
vulgar term, ore is increasingly the mark of masculinity among youth 
outside of Tokyo, both as an overt marker of adolescent rebellion and in 
flagrant disregard for the implications of their relative social distance 
from the refinements of Tokyo still privileged by society as a whole. In 
fact, it is precisely this earthy quality that held Ogai’s attention as he 
translated the first act of Goethe’s Faust. Although Ogai himself would 
have been the first to acknowledge that he sacrificed rhyme to tone, he 
did so in order to preserve the raciness of the original. Agitated, Faust 
begins:37
Hate sate, ore wa tetsugaku mo
hôgaku mo igaku mo
arazu mo gana no shingaku mo
nesshin ni benkyô shite, soko no soko made kenkyû shita.
Sô shite koko ni kô shite iru.  Ki ni doku na, baka no ore da na.
Habe nun, ach!  Philosophie,
Juristerei und Medizin,
Und leider auch Theologie
Durchaus studiert, mit heissem
Bemûhn.
Da steh’ ich nun, ich armer Tor,
Und bin so klug als wie zuvor!
36 On several occasions, recently, editors for literary journals in Japan have “corrected” 
my Japanese usage. Invariable, they insist that my phraseology “yo ni iwasereba” 
(“If I am permitted to say so”), an eloquent expression of humility used to bolster 
an author’s conclusions, be rewritten as “watakushi ni iwasereba,” their logic being 
that yo is appropriate in its usage only to those who command a degree of authority 
and sophistication when discussing literary matters. From their perspective, a non-
Japanese can never do so.
37 While sitting in Auerbachskeller on 27 December, 1885, Mori Ogai joked that he 
might translate the Faust into a Chinese metre. In July, 1911, when he began his 
translation of the Faust in earnest, he resorted to a colloquial Japanese idiom. (Ogai, 
Doitsu nikki, vol. 35: 122). It took him six months to complete and was eventually 
published in two sections, in January and in March, 1913 (Ogai, Fuausuto, in Ogai 






Likewise, ora remains a vulgar expression used by men and 
women alike in rural areas of Northern Japan, and oidon enjoys 
widespread acceptance on the southern island of Kyûshû.
But for the sake of discussion, it is important to recognize that 
self-referencing of the sort characterizing the Japanese language in 
no way represents an anomaly. From my own sorely limited linguistic 
experiences, I am aware of at least two other languages employing such 
systems. In spoken Korean, for example, there exists a similar variety 
of self-referential pronouns, including ju, na, so-seng, chae, mohm, so-
inn, and ah, to name but a few. Or in Bahasa Indonesia, where the 
variety is, relatively speaking, somewhat less expansive, the pronominal 
system is however similarly daunting for its remarkable nuance: from 
the polite standard saya, through the somewhat awkward aku originally 
from the Javanese), daku a poetic form only), gua a slang term heard 
primarily in Jakarta and surrounding locales), and beta used only in 
classical texts and indicating the speaker’s affiliations with traditional 
Malay royalty), to diri meaning “personal,” as in lepar diri, a personal 
report) and diriku myself). In both instances, the linguistic ideologies are 
reflected directly within the pronoun system itself and, by association, 
by modes of self-characterization. Self-referential terms are, I suspect, 
the most revealing of layers of ideological nuance, precisely in the 
culturally-bounded notions of intimacy and distance, engagement and 
detachment.
Taking my cues from this underlying linguistic ideology, I argue 
for the value in viewing self-reflection as a product of the culture itself 
and not as imposed from without. Selves in this view cease to hold 
their attractiveness as referential symbols--Saussure’s Transcendental 
Signified--in favor of signification, as constructs the nature of which 
is oppositional and relational. Jaçques Derrida (1978) cautions that 
the privileging of the signified--as the Saussurean sign is tied to a 
larger logocentricism, it empowers the Eurocentric desire to fix and 
master meaning--should by no means be assumed to have some 
self-evident and rational basis for self-constructions. Rather the sign 
always already bears the “trace” of difference in the sense that Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1975, p. 114) had suggested: as a “trace,” it is already 
defined through difference and absence. In no less significant a way, 
the “I” elected in self-representation, however exposed it may seem, is 
hardly monolithic. Within the Japanese context, it/they is/are the site, 
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No longer universal essences as the Cartesian model had long insisted, 
selves and their constructions must, therefore, be viewed as part and 
parcel of a culturally specific strategy of rhetorical assertions. For as 
Barthes (1974, p.139) recognized somewhat earlier, the subjectivity 
embodied in the usage of the “I” is “not the ship but its wake, not 
the plow but its furrow.” His implication cannot be clearer: identities 
resist closure and in doing so reveal a complex of shifting multiple 
facets of self-positioning. Or later, he qualifies with an observation 
that the “I” is nothing more than “the person who utters the present 
instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance ‘I,’” an attempt 
at representing what Chris Weedon (1987, p.25) terms the “temporary 
retrospective fixing” of meaning and identity. The consequences of 
such an understanding portend no less than the radical overthrow of 
those traditional discussions of self and selfhood that by and large 
have dominated our study of all national literatures. No less than 
the evolution of a radical and radically new idiom for representing 
“modern” although hardly new) identity, what has long been heralded 
as the autonomous subject stands before us as an Emperor defrocked 
for all to see.  In some parts of the world, the self is no longer unified. 
No worse for wear, it never was.
Concluding remarks
 If we accept that the ultimate goal of narrating the self, as 
Lacan suggests, is somehow to do away with that space creating it as a 
separation from the object of its desires, then we can say that fictional 
self-representations mandate by definition a reactivation of the search 
of origin, for a reference, however momentary and fragmented that will 
not only precede all judgments but will in effect have given rise to them. 
As Ogai’s fictional Rodin vindicates the actress Hanako’s rare beauty to 
the student Kubota, “The human body as a form in itself is of no interest. 
It is a mirror of the soul. What interests me is the internal flame that 
appears through the form.”38  Whether a catch-all term incorporating 
modes of distinction based upon the lure of an impossible identity of 
the speaking subject or a monadic reduction of the context in which 
38 To understand Rodin’s explanation, however, we must first recall another significant 
detail from the narrative: while Hanako posed in the nude, the student Kubota is held 
up in the library of Hôtel Biron (the actual building has no library), preoccupied with 







the beginning and the end of first-person discourse somehow coalesce 
to keep the subject from being alienated from a past over which he 
assumes authority, Hanako’s internal flame--her multiple, relationally 
defined selves--offers us as readers culturally specific possibilities 
for representation via the intercalating of desire with the inextricable 
connectedness of selves certainly, but how does the narrator represent 
an image of the self at once divorced from external reality, arising 
from, and exposing the recesses of some as-yet uncharted interiority? 
The answer we find during the late Meiji is deceptive in its simplicity: 
he invents an idiom for identity, thereby facilitating the acquisition of 
knowledge that is simultaneously local and non-centralized. That is 
to say, via identity a narrator performs, and what s/he performs is, as 
Dell Hymes (1981, p.86) would recognize, a “discourse that [makes] no 
sense outside of its own local context.” Self-referential works, then, 
are at the very least ambiguous. They, too, raise the most perplexing 
theoretical questions, especially when sincerity is made an issue.  If the 
sincere writer maintains the facade of telling the truth about himself--
whether that truth be historical, psychological, or fictional--the reading 
audience is forced to problematize the notion of self-representation, 
forced to confront the likelihood that the self is itself reducible to the 
manipulation of linguistic and cultural conventions.39
Hence, narrators in fictional contexts of necessity devote 
tremendous energy to self-awareness, as reflected by their degree of 
concomitant sensitivity to the boundaries of self and non-self, the Other 
comprised by society and social values. But because of an awareness 
of distance implying the degree of difference, the parameters of self-
consciousness--the incomplete or as-yet unwritten self, the perceived 
object of desire, and those events leading up to this need for self-
narration--convey the illusion of simultaneously being revealed within 
the act of their reading. Any search for ontological certainty, a hallmark 
of the Cartesian premise, however, is rendered futile from the outset 
by the temporal and spatial limitations of our faculty of perceptions. 
Furthermore, in keeping with their performative nature, representations 
of the fragmentation of self and of the collapse of identity arise from a 
complicit collaboration between narrator and the reading audience: the 
result of narrating the multidimensionality and the cyclical movement of 
the experience in terms of a wholly linear line of progression toward or 
away from) self-fulfillment is a perceptible quilting or warping effect 
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in which the abstractable “I” becomes the sum of rhetorical strategies 
in combination with the election of pronominal shifting. What we as 
readers come face to face with is the representation of a “virtual life,” 
as much an illusion as is the space created in painting, and what gets 
narrated is but a semblance, a virtual history. Narrative, then, becomes 
the processing of what Dorrine Kondo (1990, p.10) terms an “emerging 
order” we recognize as culture.
Stuart Hampshire (1971) once questioned the means by which a 
particular narrative voice may watch for and endorse its own moments 
of spontaneity and natural passion without an ironical awareness of its 
own duplicity,40 but the answers we now know are hardly universal. 
Within the Japanese context, for example, it cannot. It can only 
accept the fictionality, as well as the fragmentation, inherent in the 
performative representative of itself. Hence, any invocation of the “I” is 
simultaneously the describe both of the process by which the problematic 
of identity and self-representation emerged and of the particular 
contexts from which it took its form.  Catherine Lutz’s emphasis on 
the “emergent contested” natures of identity where “meaning is . . . a 
social rather than an individual achievement--an emergent product of 
social life,” (LUTZ, 1988, p. 124) implicates the underlying culturally 
and historically constructed ideological practices themselves. Her 
questioning of the cultural strategies behind self-construction is, as 
Kondo shrewdly demonstrates, tantamount to questioning the role of 
ideology in the arena of emerging selfhoods.  
Furthermore, to understand the idioms of selfhood as enactments 
and rhetorical assertions is to observe their contextual construction 
within shifting fields of power and meaning inseparable from the specific 
and discernible situations, culturally specific conventions affecting their 
narration, in short, the specificity of historical moment. In the Japanese 
context, then, identity is clearly not the unified essence implied by the 
Cartesian premise, but it can be the presentation or performance of 
a spatiotemporal locatedness of contradiction and disunity, a nexus 
wherein multiple discourses temporarily coincide in remarkable and 
discernible ways we apprehend in the abstracted self.
But it is not enough that we as readers celebrate in the 
particularity of these performance as expressions of what is often 
dismissed as “local knowledge.” Rather, we must question what social 
institutions--be they alien or indigenous--these performances address. 






What conventions did they oppose? What apparatus of power does the 
dialectic of the gaze set itself in opposition? For only by questioning the 
strategies that erected the facade of boundedness in general and one in 
particular that created the illusions of insulating the self from the play 
of power relations in specific works of fictional self-representation can 
we hope to force a larger reconsideration of selves and their pathways 
to emergence. In many ways, my task as a member of a particular 
reading audience has been and will always be to visualize the overall 
impact of cultural forces on patterns of fictional self-representation 
and to accept that identity is negotiated, open, shifting, ambiguous, 
the result of culturally available meanings and the open-ended, power-
laden enactments of these meanings in everyday situations. “We are 
all different,” Murasaki Shikibu (1996) once had reason to remark to 
herself, “And it is often difficult to know on which aspect to dwell.” 
Transcending the vast differences in time, space, and cultural origins, 
her observations share an unusual affinity with those by Sula, the object 
of--as frequently the impetus behind--the narrator’s discerning gaze 
in Toni Morrison’s novel of the same name: 
She had been looking all along for a friend, and it took her a 
while to discover that a lover was not a comrade and could 
never be--for a woman.  And that no one would ever be that 
version of herself which she sought to reach out to and touch 
with an ungloved hand.  There was only her mood and whim, 
and if that was all there was, she decided to turn the naked 
hand toward it, discover it and let others become as intimate 
with their selves as she was. (Morrison, 1973, p.159). 
Murasaki’s and Sula’s depictions of their respective worlds, 
however characterized by absence--of unity, of coherence, of meaning-
-cease to be that of presenting certain narrated actions alone. “In this 
work, when it shall be found that much is omitted,” Samuel Johnson 
remarks in his Dictionary of the English Language, “Let it not be forgotten 
that much likewise is performed.” In addition to problematizing the 
devices through which they construct themselves and their lives in all 
their complexity, contradiction, and irony within discursive fields of 
power and meaning, in culturally-specific situations and at specific 
historical moments, their use of multiple, shifting voices facilitating 
this de-centering and de-essentializing of selves represents a 
concerted effort to oppose and, in doing so, to authorize the collapse, 
the obfuscation of the mimetic and the universal.  Insofar as they 
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too, demonstrate that the intertextual relationships we apprehend 
in first-person narrative acts are less a name for the dynamic of 
the ideology of one text to particular prior texts and their inherent 
ideologies than a designation of its participation within the discursive 
discourses called Culture. Read in this light, literary depictions of self 
and the process of distancing inherent to all acts of subjection promise 
us no less than a marvelous heteroglossia wherein intimacy becomes 
both an essential vehicle for configuring reality and a bridge to our 
increased understanding of the roles of and interrelationships between 
representation and culture on the one hand and being and knowing on 
the other.
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